In this paper we relate dynamics associated to zero-sum games (Fictitious play) to Hamiltonian dynamics. It turns out that the Hamiltonian dynamics which is induced from fictitious play, has properties which are rather different from those found in more classically defined Hamiltonian dynamics. Although the vectorfield is piecewise constant (and so the flow φt piecewise a translation), the dynamics is rather rich. For example, there exists a Hamilton H so that for each t > 0 the level set H −1 (t) is homeomorphic to S 3 (the level sets consist of pieces of hyperplanes in R 4 ) and with the following property. There exists a periodic orbit Γ of the Hamiltonian flow in H −1 (1) so that the first return map F to a section Z ⊂ H −1 (1) transversal to Γ at x ∈ Γ acts as a random-walk: there exist a nested sequence of annuli An in Z (around x so that ∪An ∪ {x} is a neighbourhood of x in Z) shrinking geometrically to x so that for each sequence n(i) ≥ 0 with |n(i + 1) − n(i)| ≤ 1 there exists a point z ∈ Z so that F i (z) ∈ A n(i) for all i ≥ 0.
Introduction and statement of results
In this paper we will introduce a rather unusual class of Hamiltonian systems. These are motivated by dynamics, usually referred to as Fictitious Play, associated to zero-sum games. These Hamiltonian systems differ from those that are considered traditionally, in that their orbits consist of piecewise straight lines and first return maps to certain planes are piecewise isometries. Specifically, the Hamiltonian systems we consider are continuous and piecewise affine, and defined by the Hamiltonian H : Σ × Σ → R,
(1.1)
Here M is a n × n matrix, p, q ∈ Σ, the set of probability vectors in R n and p stands for the transpose of p. The function H is continuous and piecewise affine (H is affine outside some finite union of hyperplanes). Under some very general assumption, the level sets of H are homeomorphic to S 2n−3 and made up of pieces of some hyperplanes, see Theorem 1.1. In this paper we concentrate on matrices for which there existp,q ∈ Σ so thatp M and Mq are multiplies of v = (1 1 . . . 1) resp. its transpose v and so that all components ofp andq are strictly positive. In this case the pair (p,q) is called a completely mixed Nash equilibrium, due to its game-theoretic interpretation, see Section 2.
In some of the theorems we shall need to make a transversality assumption. Since in Theorem 1.5 the setting is slightly more general, let us assume that M is a m × n matrix with m and n not necessarily equal. The transversality assumption we will make is that each minor of M and of M is non-zero (1.2)
where M is some (any) (m − 1) × n (resp. n × (n − 1)) matrix obtained by subtracting some row of M from all other rows of M (resp some column from all other columns). These conditions are open and dense (and of full Lebesgue measure). Note that if this condition holds, then the Nash equilibrium is unique, see Lemmas 2.1 and 2.2.
A class of new Hamiltonian systems
The first aim of this paper is to show that this class of Hamiltonian flows is rather interesting, and secondly to show that these flows are indeed related to fictitious play. Theorem 1.1 shows that when rather weak conditions are satisfied on M , the Hamiltonian flow is continuous. Then we state Theorems 1.2 and 1.3 which cite results from van Strien and Sparrow [2009] which show that such Hamiltonian systems have rather different dynamics from classical Hamiltonian systems. Theorem 1.4 shows that these Hamiltonian system correspond to Fictitious play associated to the two-player n×n zero-sum game with matrix M , and Theorem 1.5 deal with the more general two-player m × n zero-sum games, showing that the Nash equilibria are unique and that the flow associated to Fictitious play is continuous, provided (1.2) holds.
Theorem 1.1 (H defines a continuous piecewise translation flow).
Assume that M is a n × n matrix satisfies the transversality assumption (1.2) and let H : Σ × Σ → R be as in (1.1). Then the following properties hold.
• Each level set H −1 (c) (taking c > 0) is topologically a sphere S 2n−3 (made up of pieces of hyperplanes in Σ × Σ); moreover, H −1 (0) = {p,q}.
• The Hamiltonian flow dp dt = ∂H ∂q ,
associated to H : Σ × Σ → R defines a continuous flow without stationary points on each level set H −1 (c), c > 0.
• The flow is piecewise a translation flow.
• First return maps between certain hyperplanes are piecewise affine maps.
Note that to compute the derivatives ∂H ∂q and ∂H ∂p one needs to take into account that p, q are constrained to lie in Σ.
The Hamiltonian systems which appear in this way, can have rather remarkable behaviour. We illustrate this by considering an example in the next theorem. This example is part of a family of systems studied in van Strien and Sparrow [2009] in the context of dynamical systems associated to game theory. Here we only will consider the situation which corresponds to the zero-sum case. Consider where β = −1, 1 and let M be some matrix close to A. Note that A satisfies the above transversality assumption (1.2) (here we use that det(A) = 1 + β 3 ) and that its Nash equilibrium (p,q) ∈ Σ × Σ corresponds to a vector with all components equal to 1/3. Then Theorem 1.2 (The Hamiltonian flow acts 'like a random walk': an example in R 4 ). Let H be the Hamiltonian associated to a matrix M as in (1.1) where M is sufficiently close to the matrix A defined in (1.4) where β is taken as β = σ := ( √ 5 − 1)/2 ≈ 0.618. Then the set H −1 (1) is homeomorphic to S 3 and the Hamiltonian flow associated to H has a periodic orbit Γ (a hexagon in H −1 (1) ≈ S 3 ) with the following properties. If one takes the first return map F to a section Z transversal to Γ (through some point x ∈ Γ), then for each k ∈ N
• there exists a sequence of periodic points x n ∈ Z of exactly period k of the first return to Z accumulating to x;
• the first return map F to Z has infinite topological entropy.
• The dynamics acts as a random-walk. More precisely, there exist annuli A n in Z (around Γ ∩ Z so that ∪A n ∪ {x} is a neighbourhood of x in Z) shrinking geometrically to Γ ∩ Z so that for each sequence n(i) ≥ 0 with |n(i + 1) − n(i)| ≤ 1 there exists a point z ∈ Z so that F i (z) ∈ A n(i) for all i ≥ 0.
One obvious consequence of the random walking described in the theorem, is the following unusual behavior. Take > 0 small and define the local and unstable stable set corresponding to rate τ as W s,τ (Γ) := {x; dist(φ t (x), Γ) ≤ for all t ≥ 0 and lim t→∞ 1 |t| log(dist(φ t (x), Γ)) → τ } W u,τ (Γ) := {x; dist(φ t (x), Γ) ≤ for all t ≤ 0 and lim
Then the above system has for each > 0 and each τ ≥ 0 close to zero, that both W s,τ and W s,τ are non-empty in any neighbourhood of Γ. Orbits spiral around Γ with a tighter pitch, the closer the orbit is to Γ, see Fig 1 . This is the reason why the first return map to a section Z can have an infinite number of fixed points, accumulating to Z ∩ Γ. The reason why one has such strange dynamics, is that the first return map P : Z → Z near to Γ has a very special form. If we identify Z with R 2 and Γ ∩ Z with 0 ∈ R 2 , then P has essentially a composition of maps of the form
Here ||(x 1 , x 2 )|| = |x 1 |+|x 2 | is the l 1 norm on R 2 , R t is a rotation over angle t leaving the 'circles' in the l 1 norm invariant (i.e. ||R t (x)|| = ||x||) and A is a matrix of the form A = 2 0 0 0.5 .
Note that F is a homeomorphism, which is smooth. (The actual first return map is piecewise affine, which is one reason why the actual return map has a more complicated expression.) The image of a ray through 0 is under the map F is a spiral, see Figure 2 . There exist r ∈ (0, 1) so that F can send a point in the annulus F n := {x ∈ R 2 ; r i+1 ≤ ||x|| ≤ r i } to annuli F n−N , . . . , F n+N in a way which almost completely 'forgets' where the point started from. So the dynamics can be essentially modelled by that of a random walk. Indeed, it was proved in [2009] that there are orbits which can go to 0 at a prescribed speed. The image of a set {x ∈ R 2 ; ||x|| = 1} under the first six iterates of F is drawn in Figure 3 . There exists a sequence of fixed points (and points of higher periods) accumulating to z = Z ∩ Γ of the first return map to Z. In the middle two figures, orbits are drawn near a piece of Γ. Orbits spiral along rectangular tubes around Γ. Orbits starting nearer to Γ spiral with a finer pitch around Γ, see the 2nd figure on the middle. Locally orbits spiral on these rectangular tubes, but it is certainly not true that orbits remain on topological tori around Γ, because the tube is skewed when it has fully followed the entire orbit Γ, see the figure on the right. Another way of visualising the dynamics is by considering a global first return section. • The orbit through each point x ∈ H −1 (1) \ Γ intersects the topological disc D infinitely many times (and each of these intersections is transversal). So D is a global section with a well-defined first return map.
• The first return time of z to D tends to zero and the first map tends to the identity, when z ∈ D \ Γ tends to z ∈ Γ.
That it is possible to find a disc D whose boundary is equal to an orbit Γ, which is a global section and so that it extends to the identity on the boundary, is related to the fact that the flow coils around Γ as in Figure 1 . This is of course rather different from what happens when a vector field is smooth, and so such a disc D certainly could not exist if the vector field had been smooth. Figure 4 shows an orbit of the first return map to D. There are two 'egg-shaped' regions which are permuted by the first return map. Orbits within this region form invariant circles (these 'egg-shaped' regions have period two). At the center of these regions there is a periodic orbit of period two. Locally, the map is a rigid rotation over an angle which is determined by the parameter β. For β = σ the rotation angle is a irrational number, so orbits under the first return map lie on circles.
Relationship with zero sum games (and some new results about fictitious play)
The final two theorems of this paper show that the dynamics that we introduced in the previous two theorems, actually are naturally associated to zero-sum games. In this way we will also shed new light on dynamics associated to zero-sum games. Brown [1949] suggested a dynamical system which can be used to approximate the Nash equilibria of a zero-sum game and it was shown Robinson [1951] that indeed solutions converge to the Nash equilibria of this game. In the continuous case this system is given by the differential equation dp
(1.6) Some authors prefer a different time parametrization (taking s = e t ), which gives dp
, dp
n be the space of probability vectors in R m resp R n . Here p A , p B represent the strategy profile of player A resp. B, see Section 2 and BR A and BR B are defined similarly as before, see 2.10 and 2.11. Note that M is now a m × n matrix with m and n not necessarily equal. The latter parametrisation allows for a learning interpretation of the dynamics, see [1998] . Sometimes the differential equation (1.5) is called the best-response dynamics and (1.7) fictitious play dynamics.
Even though orbits converge to the Nash equilibrium of a game, one can ask how this convergence goes. We will describe this first in the case when n = m and the Nash equilibrium is unique and completely mixed. In this case write Σ = Σ A = Σ B and let p = p A and q = p B . To describe how convergence occurs, we decomposes the differential equation in a radial and a 'spherical' direction (in a similar way to writing a vector field in polar or spherical coordinates). This can be done as follows. Let as before
Note that
and note that H(p,q) = 0 since (p,q) is a completely mixed Nash equilibrium. Take a half-ray l + throughp,q. The function H is monotonically increasing on l + . In particular, l + intersects H −1 (1) in a unique point and so we can define
to be the corresponding map. In this way, we have defined 'spherical coordinates':
where r = H(p, q) and φ = π(p, q).
Theorem 1.4. Assume that n = m and the two-player zero-sum game has a unique completely mixed Nash equilibrium. Then, in these spherical coordinates, best response dynamics (1.5) becomes
and fictitious play dynamics (1.7) becomes
where X is piecewise constant (and so the flow is a piecewise translation flow). Moroever, X is linearly equivalent to the Hamiltonian vector field on H −1 (1) ≈ S 2n−3 corresponding to dp dt
(which has no stationary points).
So orbits converge to the Nash equilibrium with r(t) = ce −t (resp. r(t) = c/t) and with the motion of φ similar to that of a Hamiltonian flow. Note that Hamiltonian flows are volume preserving and therefore do not have attracting periodic orbits. In the trivial case of a 2×2 game, then H −1 (c), c > 0, is the boundary of a quadrilateral and the Hamiltonian flow moves either clockwise or counter clockwise, see Figure 5 . But in the higher dimensional case of a k × k game with k ≥ 3, typical orbits will have chaotic motion in the spherical direction since a Hamiltonian flow preserves volume. For typical starting points, players switch strategies erratically.
One application of related to the main theorem in Krishna and Sjostrom [1998] . This theorem states that for generic games, it is impossible for an open set of initial conditions to all converge to the Nash equilibrium with the same cyclic play (i.e. choosing the same periodic sequence of strategies). The corollary shows that this theorem does NOT hold in general:
Corollary 1.1. For zero-sum games it is possible that an open set of initial conditions converges with cyclic play to the Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Consider the game (1.4) from Theorem 1.2. This game has an orbit which converges periodically to the Nash equilibrium, see [2009] . This orbit corresponds to a periodic orbit for the induced flow on the level set. If one considers the Poincaré first return map to the global section from Theorem 1.2, then this map has a periodic point of period 2 at the intersection of this orbit with the section (these two points are at the 'centre' of the two egg-shaped regions in Figure 4 ). From [2009] and [2008] it follows that the multiplier of this first return map is on the unit circle. Since the first return map is locally a rotation, it follows that orbits stay on two circles around this periodic two orbit. When the parameter β is chosen to be equal to the golden mean σ = ( √ 5 − 1)/2, then the rotation has irrational angle, and the orbits spiral dense on these circles. For fictitious play, this gives that orbits spiral towards the Nash equilibrium along the cones over these circles with apex the Nash equilibrium.
Since the differential equations (1.5) and (1.7) are differential inclusions and not differential equations, and moreover the right hand side of these are not Lipschitz, one cannot guarantee uniqueness of solutions and continuous dependence on initial conditions. However, provided the transversality conditions from the introductions hold, all these difficulties are absent. More precisely, on the way to proving Theorem 1.1, we also prove the following theorem (where the new part is the last statement, continuity of Fictitious play): Theorem 1.5. Assume that we have a m × n two-player zero-sum game with m and n not necessarily equal. Assume that (1.2) holds. Then
• the Nash equilibrium (p A * , p B * ) is unique;
• there exist i 1 , . . . , i r ∈ {1, . . . , m} and j 1 , . . . , j r ∈ {1, . . . , n} so that p A * ∈ e i1 , . . . , e ir ⊂ Σ A and p B * ∈ e j1 , . . . , e jr ⊂ Σ B and so that moreover the i 1 , . . . , i r -th component of p • the other components of p A , p B decrease monotonically with time for any solution of the differential equations (1.5) and (1.7).
• (1.5) and (1.7) define continuous flows.
Here we write e i1 , e i2 , . . . , e i l for the part of the boundary of Σ A where only the i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i l coordinates are non-zero ( e j1 , . . . , e jr ⊂ Σ B is defined similarly). This theorem tells us that the dynamics decomposes into a monotone movement towards e i1 , . . . , e ir × e j1 , . . . , e jr ⊂ Σ A ×Σ B and a movement inside the r × r subgame e i1 , . . . , e ir × e j1 , . . . , e jr . 
The organisation of this paper
In Sections 2 we shall prove the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium and the first three parts of Theorem 1.5. Then in Section 3 to 5 we shall prove Theorem 1.4. Theorem 1.2 is proved in van Strien & Sparrow [2009] . In fact, in that paper we study a family of systems which includes non-zero sum games and show that the random-walk behavior from Theorem 1.2 occurs in some induced dynamics. In the present paper we show that the zero-sum case corresponds Hamiltonian dynamics, so the proof of Theorem 1.2 is a combination of the results from van Strien & Sparrow [2009] and Theorem 1.4. Finally we shall prove Theorem 1.1 and Theorem 1.5 in Section 6.
Zero sum games
In this section we will show that in the present setting, the Nash equilibrium is unique if M is invertible or if the transversality assumption (1.2) holds. This will in particular prove the first three part of Theorem 1.5. Consider a two-player zero-sum game with n strategies. This means that players A and B each choose a probability vector p A and p B in R m resp. R n . For convenience, let Σ A ⊂ R m and Σ B ⊂ R n be the space of probability vectors in R m resp. R n . So p A ∈ Σ A describes the strategy profile of player A and p B ∈ Σ B that of player B. 
(2.13)
B * is called the value of the game. A similar definition can be given for many player games, but in the situation we consider of two-player zero-sum game the notion (2.12) of Nash equilibrium coincides with that of a minimax equilibrium (2.13) (a notion introduced earlier by von Neumann for two-player games).
It was shown by von Neumann that each zero-sum has a unique value, and that each zero-sum game has at least one Nash equilibrium (or minimax solutions as von Neumann called them). Moreover, the set of Nash equilibria is convex. However, in general the Nash equilibrium is not unique, see for example Section 7. In this note we primarily consider the situation that there exists a Nash equilibrium (p A * , p B * ) which are completely mixed (so all components of these vectors are strictly positive). 
does not have the same value as the Nash equilibrium, and so is not a Nash equilibrium.
The proof shows that it is enough that the sets {p A ∈ R m ; p A M = v} and {p B ∈ R n ; M p B = v } are one-dimensional, where v = (1 1 . . . 1) and v is its transpose. This condition is slightly more natural than requiring that M is invertible. Indeed, the matrices M andM are equivalent as far as the games are concerned whenM = a M + b with a, b ∈ R. But within the class of equivalent matrices, the property of invertibility is not preserved, whereas the latter condition is.
Since we also want to consider two-player m × n zero-sum games, let us prove the analogous result for such games.
Lemma 2.2. Assume that (1.2) holds. Then we have the following properties.
• Consider a linear space Z A ⊂ Σ A ⊂ R m where player B is indifferent between strategies j 1 , j 2 , . . . , j k ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Moreover consider a r-dimensional face e i1 , . . . , e ir of Σ A . Then Z A ∩ e i1 , . . . , e ir has codimension (k − 1) as a subset of e i1 , . . . , e ir (or is empty). A similar statement holds when the roles of players A and B are interchanged.
• The Nash equilibrium (p A * , p B * ) of the game is unique.
• there exists i 1 , . . . , i r ∈ {1, . . . , m} and j 1 , . . . , j r ∈ {1, . . . , n} so that p A * ∈ e i1 , . . . , e ir ⊂ Σ A and p B * ∈ e j1 , . . . , e jr ⊂ Σ B and so that moreover the i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i r components of p A * and the j 1 , j 2 , . . . , j r coordinates of p B * are non-zero (so (p A * , p B * ) is a completely mixed Nash equilibrium w.r.t. to this r × r subgame). At p A * player B is indifferent between strategies j 1 , . . . , j r and all other strategies are less preferred. Similarly at p B * player A is indifferent between strategies i 1 , . . . , i r and all other strategies are less preferred.
A more abstract way of rephrasing the first part of this lemma is that all the boundary faces of Σ A (of any dimension) are in general position w.r.t. the linear spaces where player B is indifferent to a number of strategies. (Analogously to the fact that two lines in R 3 typically will miss each other.)
Proof. Consider a linear space Z A ⊂ Σ A ⊂ R m where player B is indifferent between strategies j 1 , j 2 , . . . , j k ∈ {1, . . . , n}. This space is equal to the set of p A ∈ Σ A where p A M = 0, where M is the (k − 1) × n matrix made up from the difference of the j 2 , . . . , j k -th and the j 1 -th column vector of the matrix M . By only considering the matrix M * which consists of only the i 1 , . . . , i r -th rows of M , we get the intersection of Z A with e i1 , . . . , e ir . Since, by assymption (1.2) the matrix M has maximal rank, it follows that this intersection has codimension (k − 1) in e i1 , . . . , e ir . (So if r < k − 1 then the intersection is empty. The intersection will be also empty when the intersection of Z A with the linear space through e i1 , . . . , e ir is outside Σ A .)
Let (p A * , p B * ) be a Nash equilibrium and assume that player B is indifferent between k (optimal) strategies and say player A is indifferent between l (optimal) strategies and to be definite assume that k ≤ l. Let j 1 , . . . , j k ∈ {1, . . . , n} be these optimal strategies for player B. Note that by the first part of the lemma we have that k ≤ m. Since only the j 1 , . . . , j k strategies are optimal for B, we get that p B * ∈ e j1 , . . . , e j k ⊂ Σ B . But this implies (by the first part of the lemma) that player A can only be indifferent between at most k strategies (and between at most k − 1 strategies if p B * is also contained in some lower-dimensional sub-simplex of e j1 , . . . , e j k ). Since we assumed that k ≤ l we get that k = l and that all these strategies are optimal (and that the j 1 , . . . , j k -th components of p B * are strictly positive). If i 1 , . . . , i k ∈ {1, . . . , m} are the optimal strategies of A, then p A * ∈ e i1 , . . . , e i k ⊂ Σ A (and the i 1 , . . . , i k -th components of p A * are strictly positive.
Using Lemma 2.1 the Nash equilibrium is unique within this k × k subgame. If the game has two Nash equilibria, then a convex combination of these is also a Nash equilibrium and so there would be a completely mixed Nash equilibrium in a k × k subgame with k > k (containing the k × k subgame from before). But this contradicts the uniqueness of completely mixed Nash equilibrium we already established. equilibria of this game. In the continuous case this system is given by the differential equation
(3.14)
Some authors prefer a different time parametrization (taking s = e t ), which gives dp
Strictly speaking, the equations (3.14) and (3.15) are differential inclusions, but it is not hard to show that it has solutions nevertheless, see [1984] ). One can also consider a discrete version of these dynamical systems, but we will not consider this here. Even in the case when the players are involved in a general sum game, the above differential equations make sense (in this case BR A and BR B are defined similar as before by BR A (p B ) := arg max p A Ap B and BR B (p A ) := arg max p A Bp B where A and B are two different matrices A). There are many papers which show that one has convergence to the equilibrium in particular situations: for games where one or both of the players have only 2 strategies to choose from, see Miyasawa [1961] and Metrick & Polak [1994] for the 2 × 2 case; Sela [2000] for the 2 × 3 case; and Berger [2005] for the general 2 × n case. Jordan [1993] constructed a 2 × 2 × 2 fictitious game with a stable limit cycle. The 3 × 3 example studied in this paper, shows that the situation is far more complicated in general, see Sparrow at al [2008] and van Strien & Sparrow [2009] . Theorem 1.2 summarises some of the results from these last two papers.
Another important reason for studying these differential equations is because they can be used as a model for rational learning, see for example Fudenberg and Levine [1998] .
It is easy to prove Robinson's result (in the continuous case) and to show the r part of 'r-part' of (1.8) and (1.9) is as claimed in Theorem 1.4.
. Then (1.5) gives dH dt = −H and (1.7) gives dH dt = −H/t. So H tends to zero along orbits (as H(t) = ce −t resp. H(t) = c/t where c depends on the initial condition). Furthermore, the zero set of H coincides with the set of Nash equilibria of the game. Moreover, if the Nash equilibrium is unique, the flow is continuous at this Nash equilibrium.
Proof. To show that solutions of (1.5) and (1.7) tend to Nash equilibria, we show that
is a Nash equilibrium. Since BR A and BR B are piecewise constant, (1.5) implies
This use of H as a Lyapunov function goes back to Brown [1949] and was explicitly mentioned in Hofbauer [1995] . Harris [1998] used a related method to analyse the speed of convergence to the value of the game.
The induced flow associated to fictitious play is piecewise a translation
In this section we will compute the induced differential equation which we obtain after projecting (1.5) and (1.7) onto a level set of H. In this section we shall not assume that n = m.
is continuous, because of the definition of BR A and BR B . It is even piecewise affine (it is locally affine on sets where BR A and BR B are locally constant). Let us denote the Nash equilibrium of the game by (E A , E B ). On each half-ray starting at (E A , E B ) the function H is strictly increasing and, moreover, H(E A , E B ) = 0. It follows that for each c > 0, H −1 (c) is topologically a sphere, i.e. homeomorphic to S 2n−3 . The orbit of the first differential equation is
Let us project this from (E A , E B ) onto a level set of H. That is, takẽ
with s(t) so that the curve remains within a level set of V . To do this, we have to choose s(t) so that
and therefore the previous equation is equivalent to
i.e., to 1 − s(t) = e t and s(t) = 1 − e t . So the orbit becomes
So dp
If instead of (1.5) one uses (1.7) then one gets (using that s = e t ), dp
This is obviously a translation flow, because the right hand side is piecewise constant. This completes the proof of equations (1.8) and (1.9). Note that the induced flow on level sets of H is volume preserving system.
The induced flow is Hamiltonian
Let assume now that n = m and consider again
To make the role of p A , p B symmetric, let us write
where · stands for the inner product. Notice that p A ∈ Σ A , p B ∈ Σ B . The derivatives restricted to Σ A and Σ B are of the form
where λ A , λ B are chosen so that the vector lies in the tangent space of Σ A , Σ A . In other words, we need to ensure that the sum of the vectors add up to zero. Notice that M E B is also of the form
, so one needs to take µ = 1 to get that the sum of the components of the vector add up to zero. Similarly µ = 1. It follows that
It follows that the differential equation from the previous section can be written as
This is linearly equivalent to a Hamiltonian system in standard form. Indeed, take matrices A and B, and take x = A p A and y = Bp B . Then
Taking B = Id and A = T r(M ) −1 (or B = M −1 and A = Id) gives then the usual Hamiltonian form x = ∂H ∂y y = − ∂H ∂x .
Continuity of zero-sum fictitious play
In this section we shall show that fictitious play defines a continuous flow, provided the transversality condition from the introduction of the paper hold. In this section we shall not assume that m = n. Along the set p B ∈ Z A ij where the player A is indifferent between stategies i and j, BR(p B ) is not a singleton and so the flow is not uniquely defined, and we will not be able to get continuity in general. In this section we will deal with this issue. That one needs to make assumptions follows from the example described in Figure 6 . A → 2
A → 1 A → 3 * Figure 6 : The case when M is the 3 × 3 identity matrix. The flow is multi-valued and discontinuous at any several codimension-one sets, for example when (p A , p B ) ∈ ΣA × ΣB is a point as marked by * .
To illustrate the proof that the flow is continuous, let us refer to the 2 × 2 zero-sum game, see Figure 5 . At the Nash equilibrium, the vector field is multivalued (and each directions is allowed). However, an orbit cannot move out of the Nash equilibrium, since the orbit through each point which is close to the Nash equilibrium remains close to it. A similar situation also occur in the higher dimensional case, see Figure 7 . In that figure, the orbit is multivalued along some dashed line. However, nearby orbits spiral along a rectangular cone (in a manner which is similar to the 2 × 2 zero-sum game). It follows that the resulting flow becomes continuous.
Theorem 6.1 (Transversality condition implies continuity and uniqueness). The motion defined by equations (1.5) forms a continuous flow outside (E A , E B ) provided the transversality assumption (1.2) from the introduction holds.
Proof. Let us first show that the above condition is enough to get that orbits only momentarily stay in the codimension-one planes in which (only) one of the players is indifferent. The linear space of vectors in where the l and l -th strategy are indifferent to player B consists of the vectors in Σ A ⊂ R m which are orthogonal to the difference of the l-th and l -th column vector of the matrix M . Therefore if all coefficient within each row vector of M are distinct then, for any k, the k-th unit unit vector in R m is not contained in this indifference set. Hence, an orbit immediately moves away from the codimension-one planes where only player B is indifferent (i.e. it moves transversally across these planes). (Note that (1.2) requires in particular that all coefficients of the matrices M are non-zero, and hence all coefficient within each row vector of M are distinct.) The analogous statement holds for the codimension-one planes where only player A is indifferent.
Let us call the part of Σ A where precisely r components are non-zero, a r-dimensional face of Σ A . We shall write e i1 , e i2 , . . . , e i l for the part of the boundary of Σ A where only the i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i l coordinates are non-zero.
Let us next consider the situation that the players are both indifferent between several strategies. In this case the issue is that the right hand side of (1.5) is not single valued. (So we have a differential inclusion rather than a proper differential equation.) To analyse this situation, consider a linear space Z A ⊂ Σ A ⊂ R m where player B is indifferent between strategies j 1 , j 2 , . . . , j k ∈ {1, . . . , n} and a linear space Z B ⊂ Σ B ⊂ R n where player A is indifferent between strategies i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i l ∈ {1, . . . , m}, and consider a point p A , p B where these strategies are optimal. The number of directions in which player A can move (starting from p A , p B towards e i1 , . . . , e i l while staying in Z A is equal to the dimension of Z A ∩ e i1 , e i2 , . . . , e i l . By the first assertion of Lemma 2.2 the dimension of Z A ∩ e i1 , e i2 , . . . , e i l is equal to (l − 1) − (k − 1) = l − k (in fact, even if l > k the intersection can be empty because e i1 , . . . , e i l is not some linear space, but only a simplex within such a linear space). Similarly interchanging the role of A and B, the number of directions player B can move while staying in Z B has at most dimension k − l. It follows that only when k = l the players two players can move while staying within Z A and Z B , and then there is only one direction in which they can move. So there is at most one orbit starting from p A , p B which stays within Z A , Z B . Note that even if there exists an orbit which stays within Z A and Z B there may be another solution in which moves off this set. What we will show an orbit which starts slightly off the set Z A , Z B , orbits spirals around it. (Here we use that the game is zero-sum.) In this way, it follows that the flow becomes continuous and unique.
To prove this, let us use the notation from before and notice that we have shown that only when k = l the orbit does not necessarily move transversally through Z A × Z B . So locally near a point of Z A × Z B only strategies j 1 , . . . , j k are optimal for player B and strategies i 1 , . . . , i k are optimal for player A. But one can decompose the flow as a flow where one moves towards the plane e i1 , . . . , e i k ⊂ Σ A and e j1 , . . . , e j k ⊂ Σ B , and a flow which is parallel to e i1 , . . . , e i k × e j1 , . . . , e j k . So the latter can be described as fictitious play associated to the corresponding k × k subgame with Nash equilibrium (Z A ∩ e i1 , . . . , e i k ) × (Z B e j1 , . . . , e j k ) .
By Lemma 3.1 the latter flow is continuous.
Note that everything in the proof of Theorem 6.1, except the last part, has an obvious analogue for non-zero games.
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Note that orbits of a zero-sum 2 × 2 game always orbits spiral, and cannot have a saddle-point.
7 Example of a zero-sum game with a non-unique Nash equilibrium on the boundary (for which fictitious play is non-continuous)
Consider the zero-sum game determined by M = 1 0 1 2 . Player A maximizes and B 
